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Arbitration Advocacy:

From Clause to Hearing
Celeste Hammond
tt
Jeffrey J. Mayer

Abstract
This Article provides an overview of the key differences between arbitration and litigation, a look at the past and present state of the law
governing arbitration,techniquesfor draftingarbitrationclauses, and
effective advocacy at arbitrationhearings.

Introduction
This article and the related presentation reflects the authors' collective
belief that practitioners often fail to effectively use arbitration because
(1) attorneys have inadequate information about the arbitration process,
and (2) attorneys fail to consider the entire arbitration process, from
drafting the clause to participation in the hearing, as one continuous and
related opportunity for advocacy.' Both authors are well aware that many
practitioners are unhappy with arbitration even though it is a regular part
of the commercial law practice. From these separate experiences, the
authors have reached a similar conclusion: attorneys' frustration with arbitration can be relieved and systematically cured. Moreover, the authors
believe that, though arbitration is not always appropriate, it is a disservice
tJ.D. (1968), University of Chicago Law School. Professor Hammond a professor
and the Director for the Center for Real Estate Law at John Marshall Law School.
ttA.B. (1982), Duke University; J.D. (1986), Washington University School ofLaw.
Mr. Mayer is a partner in the Chicago, Illinois law firm of Freeborn & Peters LLP.
'Both authors have long studied arbitration. Professor Hammond has written and

spoken widely on arbitration, served as an arbitrator, and prior to beginning her academic

career, handled a variety of matters in and out of court. See Celeste Hammond, The

(Pre)(As) sumed "Consent" ofCommercialBindingArbitrationContracts:An Empirical Study ofAttitudes and Expectations of TransactionalLawyers, 36 J. MARSHALL L.
REv. 589 (2003). She teaches Arbitration in Real Estate Transactions in the LL.M. Real
Estate Law Program at John Marshall Law School. Mr. Mayer is active in his firm both
in carrying matters through the ADR process and drafting arbitration clauses. He has
also published and spoken widely on arbitration. See Jeffrey Mayer, Recent Mexican
Arbitration Reform: The ContinuedInfluence of the Publicistas,47 U. MIAMI L. REV.
913 (1993). He has handled a wide variety of real estate and other matters in court as
well as through arbitration and mediation.
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to the client to simply refuse to consider Alternative Dispute Resolution
options while negotiating a contract or attempting to settle a dispute.
The authors divide this Article into four sections. Section I addresses
the differences between arbitration and litigation. Section II looks at the
current state of arbitration law in the country. Section Imoffers ideas and
techniques for drafting arbitration clauses. Finally, Section IV addresses
hearing techniques and their relationships to drafting issues.

I. Understanding and Appreciating the
Differences Between Arbitration and Litigation
In available case law and practical guides, arbitration is often portrayed, simply, as an "alternate" forum-perhaps a little cheaper and more
informal than litigation, but nonetheless a variant of the familiar process.
With a judge as an arbitrator and the application of the federal rules of
evidence, arbitration may appear to be nothing more than a bench trial
conducted in a law firm conference room.'
Arbitration, however, has distinctive characteristics. These characteristics not only require a change in advocacy style, but also provide additional opportunities for advocacy on behalf of a client. Amongthese other
differences are the following:
1. Arbitration is governed by an active, and perhaps undisciplined,
decision-maker whose decision is not subject to meaningful review.
2. The rules of arbitration may be changed before and during the
arbitration. This contrasts with litigators in a federal court proceeding who have limited ability to negotiate among themselves to
direct the court as to the manner of how a trial should proceed.3
2Today in America,

arbitration is undergoing an unprecedented surge in availability,
acceptance, and institutionalization, far more than any form of dispute resolution. It
is in many respects the "rock star" of ADR considering the revenue it generates, the
attention it receives in the journals, and the almost carte blanche approval it garners from
the courts. All lawyers, and especially those in the real estate forum, must have a working knowledge of the impact that arbitration could have on their clients.

Rules 16 and 26 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure direct the parties to meet

and confer regarding certain timing and discovery issues, but those discussions are
dictated by the court. FED. R. Civ. P. 16, 26.
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3. In arbitration, the parties may have limited or even no discovery.
Even if the parties agree to a discovery process, they may have
limited ability to obtain third-party documents and testimony.
Courts may quash arbitrator's subpoenas or conclude that the
subpoena is outside the arbitrator's jurisdiction.'
4. During the arbitration hearing, parties can rehabilitate failing witnesses with hearsay or other "garbage" testimony because of the
relaxed rules of evidence.
5. An arbitrator is also different from ajudge. Serving as an arbitrator
is the greatest job in the world; not only are all the parties nice to
an arbitrator, but the arbitrator is paid first and immediately. The
arbitrator devotes extensive-and perhaps exclusive-attention to the
matter before her. Thus, practicing attorneys serving as arbitrators
have limited incentive to bring arbitration proceedings to a close,
while judges are encouraged to clear their docket. The arbitrator
often has collegial peer relationships with the advocates. The arbitrator is not likely building on a prior body of opinions as a judge
does. (An exception may be found in certain sports-related arbitrations, such as salary and discipline disputes.) The arbitrator also
has a different skill set than a judge. For example, an arbitrator,
while familiar with the rules of evidence, may not be experienced
at ruling quickly on evidentiary issues.
Arbitration, in fact, has a radically different history than litigation and
is a relatively recent phenomenon. Historically, arbitration was a very
useful dispute resolution mechanism for local commercial groups. Merchants and tradesmen utilized arbitration to settle their business disputes
among themselves. The disputing parties would explain their positions
to a fellow merchant or group of merchants and abide by their oral ruling
over the dispute. The oral ruling of these merchant arbitrators was in no
sense legally binding upon the disputants, but the fear of local ostracism
guaranteed compliance. Thus, arbitration was historically born via the
need to settle disputes informally and quickly without the corresponding
expensive and protracted litigation process.
4 See, e.g, 9 U.S.C.
§ 7 (1994) (outlining venue issues regarding subpoena power);
28 U.S.C. § 1782 (1996) (requiring that courts assist with international proceedings
which some courts have refused to apply to international arbitration proceedings).
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There were times, however, when one of the disputants would resist
arbitration despite a previously-negotiated arbitration contract. This compelled the other party to enter the court system and attempt asserting their
rights under the arbitration contract. In so doing, the parties would pray
that the court issue an order compelling arbitration. British and American
courts were not receptive to motions such as these. Rather, the courts rejected commercial efforts to assert rights under an arbitration contract,
because the courts felt that they were being ousted from their rightful
jurisdiction in these disputes.
To remedy this judicial hostility toward arbitration, the United States
Congress passed the Federal Arbitration Act of 1925 (FAA).5 The goal
of this legislation was to place arbitration contracts on the same footing
with all other legitimate contracts. Subsequent to this new federal legislation, various states passed similar laws substantiating the enforceability
of arbitration contracts. Today, courts on both the federal and state level
have embraced a strong preference for binding arbitration and enforce
arbitration contracts almost universally. In so doing, the courts are accomplishing the goals of the FAA and the various state acts by placing
arbitration contracts on the same footing as all other contracts. Furthermore, the courts are also systematically clearing their dockets of numerous commercial disputes. Thus, it appears that arbitration, once a thorn
in the side of the court's jurisdiction, has now become a darling to these
same courts.6
Today, arbitration is a private dispute resolution procedure agreed to
by the parties involved. It is almost always binding in nature, and designed pursuant to a contract. Arbitration, unlike negotiation and mediation, retains many of the qualities used in traditional litigation. A typical
arbitration will hold arguments, accept briefs, and have the option for
discovery, while a third party, quite similar to ajudge, renders a binding
decision. As noted above, however, unlike litigation, the arbitrator's
decision is not subject to any meaningful judicial review for errors in law
'9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16 (1994).
6

The civil law countries have taken a different route to achieve the same result. See,
e.g, Mayer, supra note 1, at 913 (describing civil law view of arbitration commencing
with merchant courts functioning as an adjunct to judicial proceedings under judicial
supervision).
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or fact. Some parties to arbitration have successfully contracted for an
expanded judicial review of the arbitrator's decision, but the circuits are
currently split on whether such action is permissible.7 This superficial
resemblance to judicial proceedings is misleading.
Arbitration is currently at its peak as an alternative form of dispute
resolution. Students and future practitioners would be wise to keep a
finger on its pulse and be wary of the implications to their practices and
what this will mean for their clients.

II. The Law of Arbitration: Key Concepts
A. Common Law
The common law did not provide for binding arbitration in the United
States. As alluded to above, courts were hostile to the proposition oflosing theirjurisdiction to alternative decision-making bodies. Thisjudicial
hostility eventually acquiesced into a growing acceptance of private
dispute resolution. Thus, various state and federal statutes, and even
international treaties, were enacted and ratified to govern arbitration
proceedings. However, these statutes and treaties are not enforceable
without the consent of the specific parties involved. The statutes exist
as a mechanism to govern arbitration proceedings in the event that parties
decide to contract and consent for private adjudication in lieu of traditional litigation.
The statutory schemes modifying the common law focus on this idea
of consent as being a condition precedent to arbitration. Therefore, as
long as parties consent to arbitration of their dispute, they will be bound
to the decision of the arbitration. Correspondingly, this decision is given
the full weight of anyjudicial decision. Some commentators would argue
' See generally Anthony J. Longo, Comment, Agreeing to Disagree:A Balanced
Solution to Whether PartiesMay Contractfor ExpandedJudicialReview Beyond the
FAA, 36 J. MARSHALLL. REV. 1005 (2003).
8
E.g., In re Application of RD Mgmt. Corp., 766 N.Y.S.2d 304, 196 Misc. 2d 579
(Sup. Ct. 2003) (stating that investments in real estate affect interstate commerce and
are subject to the FAA in state court and that arbitration is regularly employed to resolve
real estate disputes).
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that an arbitrator's decision is given even more weight than a judicial
decision, because overturning or vacating the arbitrator's decision is difficult, whereas judges are overturned daily.'
An arbitrator's award is difficult to vacate because the statutes governing arbitration proceedings limit the legitimate alternatives that a defeated
party can assert as a basis for reversal. Consent to arbitration is merely
consent to a decision, and not necessarily consent to a "correct" decision.
Courts have acknowledged this in many recent decisions. For example,
in MerrillLynch v. Jaros," appellants appealed the district courtjudgment
sustaining the arbitration panel's award by stating that there was a disregard of the laws governing the timeliness of appellee client's claims.
The Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment by confirming
that the award was not palpably faulty.l" The court stated that interpretation of law by arbitrators is not subject to judicial review for errors in
interpretation. 2 State courts have also generally acknowledged that arbitrators are above the law when making binding decisions upon the parties.
In Moncharsch v. Heily & Blasg, the Supreme Court of California noted
that "[a]rbitrators, unless specifically required to act in conformity with
rules of law, may base their decision upon broad principles ofjustice and
equity, and in doing so may expressly or impliedly reject a claim that a
partymight successfully have asserted in ajudicial action."' 3 Thisjudicial
acknowledgment of the arbitrator's relative freedom when rendering a
decision is hardly an emerging trend. The United States Supreme Court
articulated this fifty years earlier in Wilko v. Swan.'4
This case requires subjective findings on the purpose and knowledge of an
alleged violator of the Act. They must be not only determined but applied
by the arbitrators withoutjudicial instruction on the law. As their award may
be made without explanationof their reasons and without a complete record
9Furthermore, as explained below, an arbitrator may have greater powers than a
judge. See infra notes 20-25 and accompanying text.
1070 F.3d 418 (6th Cir. 1995).

"Jaros, 70 F.3d at 420.
2ld. at 422.

13
14

832 P.2d 899, 904, 10 Cal. Rptr. 2d 183, 188 (1994).
346 U.S. 427, 74 S. Ct. 182, 98 L. Ed. 168 (1953).
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of their proceedings, the arbitrators' conception ofthe legal meaning of such
statutory requirements as "burden ofproof," "reasonable care" or "material
fact," cannot be examined. 5

Thus, consider the arbitration process with fair warning in that the arbitrator is armed with the ability to selectively follow the law without the caution inherent in possible reversal. With this in mind, the authors now turn6
to the specific statutory schemes that govern arbitration proceedings.'

B. Federal Arbitration Act
The FAA applies to proceedings involving interstate commerce. The
scope of the FAA has not been heavily litigated. 7 For example, in real
estate and construction matters, it is currently an open issue as to whether
a local project is covered by the FAA if the project involves material and
labor that crosses state lines. Even if subsequent court decisions impose
a restrictive reading of the definition of commerce, 8most significant
arbitration proceedings will be governed by the FAA.'
As a general matter, the FAA provides the parties autonomy to fashion
their agreements and arbitration with less judicial intervention than
analogous state laws.' 9 The FAA, in contrast to more restrictive state law
frameworks, places virtually no limits on the parties' freedom to agree
on the rules of the arbitral process, which gives attorneys for the parties
opportunities for advocacy. Significantly, the FAA does not provide for
independent federal jurisdiction. As such, the meaning of the FAA is
developed in both state and federal courts.

11Wilko, 346 U.S. at 435-36 (emphasis added); see also Lackman v. Lorg & Foster
Real Estate, Inc., 266 Va. 20,26,580 S.E.2d 818,822 (2003) (confirming that Virginia
law will not set aside an arbitration award for reasons of equity).
16 This Article does not address issues relating to international arbitration.
7

Butsee Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 115 S. Ct. 834, 130
L. Ed. 2d 753 (1995).
8
E.g.,In re Application ofR.D. Mgmt. Corp., 766 N.Y.S.2d 304, 196 Misc. 2d 579
(Sup. Ct. 2003) (finding that investments in real estate affect interstate commerce,
invokes the FAA in state court, and allows the arbitrator to determine the scope of his
own jurisdiction).
199 U.S.C. §§ 1-16 (1994).
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C. Standard of Review
Commercial arbitration awards under the FAA are not subject to a
statutorily mandated review for errors of law. Rather, the FAA maintains
only four limited grounds for vacatur that a party can pursue in a federal
district court, ifdissatisfied with the arbitrator's decision. In other words,
the losing party at arbitration can use the FAA to ask a federal district
court to vacate the arbitration award, but that party will succeed only if
one of the four FAA listed grounds were violated. 20 Briefly these four
grounds are (1) arbitrator corruption, fraud or undue means; (2) evident
partiality or corruption; (3) misconduct or misbehavior; and (4) misuse
of power. 21 These four grounds are very narrow and are solely focused
on the arbitrator's behavior. At the same time, however, if the FAA was
intended to encourage parties to exercise their freedom to contract for
arbitration rather than litigation, then those same contractually liberated
parties should be free to agree on everything affecting their arbitration,
including a standard ofjudicial review that makes them comfortable and
keeps them out of litigation.
Whether parties can contractually demand that a federal district court
review the arbitration award for grounds not mentioned in the FAA has
split the federal circuit courts of appeal. Some circuits, such as the Third
and Fifth Circuits, allow such a demand.22 Others, such as the Seventh,
Eighth23 and Tenth Circuits, do not allow such a supplementation of the
F
FAA. 2
20

d. § 10.
Id.
22 See Roadway Package Sys., Inc. v. Kayser, 257 F.3d 287,293 (3d Cir. 2001), cert.
denied, 534 U.S. 1020 (2001) (holding "that parties may opt out of the FAA's off-therack vacatur standards and fashion their own"); Gateway Techs., Inc. v. MCI Tel. Corp.,
64 F.3d 993, 997 (5th Cir. 1995) (holding that, because the parties by their contract
agreed to expand judicial review, the contract's provision supplemented the FAA's
default standard of review).
23
See Bowen v. Amoco Pipeline Co., 254 F.3d 925, 933 (10th Cir. 2001) (refusing
to uphold contractual modifications of judicial review standard); UHC Mgmt. Co. v.
Computer Scis. Corp., 148 F.3d 992,998 (8th Cir. 1998) (holding that arbitrator's award
cannot be overturned due to error of law); Chicago Typographical Union No. 16 v.
21
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Commentators have argued that allowing parties to contract for an
expanded scope of judicial review is either per se permissible or per se
impermissible. Those who encourage the contractual expansion ofjudicial review do so in the name of freedom of contract, while those who
oppose the contractual expansion argue that parties may not abuse the
federal judiciary by creating jurisdiction by contract. One recent commentator has argued that taking an all or nothing approach to this issue
is potentially crippling to federal arbitration.24 He instead advocates a
presumption in favor of freedom to contract for expanded judicial review
that shifts the burden to the party opposing the expansion to cite a contractual or policy defense to the arbitration expansion clause. The author
insists that such a burden remains high, especially if the parties specifically bargained for the expansion clause and have relied upon it.

D. Federal Preemption
The relationship between these federal law principles and state law
is largely governed by the Supreme Court holding in Doctor'sAssocs.
v. Casarotto." In holding that the FAA preempted a Montana arbitration
statute, the United States Supreme Court employed broad preemption
language to guide later federal courts considering similar issues.26
In Doctor'sAssocs., the petitioner, a corporation that was a national
franchiser of a restaurant chain, entered into a franchise agreement with
respondent franchisee.27 The agreement permitted the respondent to open
a restaurant in Montana.2" The franchise agreement stated that all contract
Chicago Sun-Times, Inc., 935 F.2d 1501, 1505 (7th Cir. 1991) (holding that parties may
not contract for judicial review of an arbitrator's award).
24 Longo, supra note 7, at 1025-26. However, a form of judicial review may be
obtained by carefully circumscribing the arbitrator's jurisdiction and asking a court to
rule that the arbitrator exceeded her jurisdiction. Although a court will not review the
merits of an award, a court will inquire as to whether the arbitrator exceeded her jurisdiction. Thus, if an arbitrator is not empowered to issue an award in excess of one million dollars, a court can set aside a larger award.
25 517 U.S. 681, 116 S. Ct. 1652, 134 L. Ed. 2d 902 (1996).
26 Doctors Assocs., 517 U.S. at 688.
27 Id. at
28

683.

Id.
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controversies would be settled by arbitration. 29 The respondent subsequently filed suit against petitioner and its agent in Montana state court
"alleging state-law contract and tort claims relating to the franchise agreement."30 The petitioner successfully moved the trial court to stay the litigation pending arbitration.3' Thatjudgment was reversed by the Montana
Supreme Court upon its finding unenforceable the agreement's arbitration
clause because the arbitration clause did not appear in underlined, capital
letters on the first page of the agreement, as required by Montana law.32
The judgment for the petitioner was reversed and remanded based on the
court's holding that Montana's first-page notice requirement, which
specifically governed only contracts subject to arbitration, conflicted with
section two of the FAA and was therefore displaced by the FAA.3 3
Another example of the FAA preempting state statutes governing
arbitration is SaturnDistributionCorp. v. Williams.34 In Williams, a car
manufacturer sought declaratory and injunctive relief against the Commissioner of the Virginia Department of Motor Vehicles in order to challenge provisions of the Virginia Motor Vehicle Dealer Licensing Act.35
The appellee automobile dealers association intervened as a defendant,
and the trial court granted appellee's motion for summary judgment. The
appellant argued that section 46.1-550.5:27 of the Licensing Act, which
prohibited the formation of a non-negotiated agreement between a car
dealership and a manufacturer that compels arbitration of claims arising
out of the dealership agreement, was preempted by the FAA.36 The court
reversed the trial court's decision and granted the appellant summary
judgment. The court held that section 46.1-550.5:27 did conflict with the
FAA and was preempted by the Supremacy Clause.37 The court found

29

Id.

30 Id.

3"Id.; see 9 U.S.C. § 3 (2000).
32 Doctors Assocs., 517 U.S. at 684.
33 Id. at 687.
14 905 F.2d 719, 727 (4th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 983 (2001).
3 Williams, 905 F.2d at 721.
36 Id.; see 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1947).
17 Williams, 905 F.2d at 722; see U.S. CONST. art. VI.
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that the proposed arbitration provisions in the appellant's dealership
agreement were enforceable in Virginia, and that the appellee commissioner was enjoined from prohibiting the use of the arbitration provision
in contracts between appellant and its dealers."
If DoctorsAssociates is read broadly, virtually any state law limiting
arbitration clauses is, and should, be preempted. For whatever reason,
litigators have rarely made such arguments, or if they have, courts have
not ruled upon them. Accordingly, there exists a substantial body of state
laws that, in fact, may no longer be good law. The authors believe that
this is an area that is likely to be contested heavily in the years to come.
For example, Alabama state courts have acquired a renegade reputation
for departing from a firmly established Supreme Court holding in Prima
Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co." In Prima Paint,the Court
found that a fraud-in-the-inducement challenge to a contract that contained an arbitration clause should be decided by an arbitrator, not by a
court.4" Alabama state courts, however, follow the reasoning of other
courts that limit the holding in Prima Paint to "voidable" contracts-a
contract where a party is induced through fraud or a contract where a party
is an infant. Where a party challenges the very existence of a contract,
that dispute must be decided by a court." Such a restrictive posture in
comparison with the established federal precedent is common among
states like Alabama.
This is a dispute that will not be settled in the near future. Because
the FAA does not provide independent federal jurisdiction, state courts
will regularly address these issues. The United States Supreme Court is
not likely to intervene again. As such, the law in this area will continue
to be inconsistent.

" Williams, 905 F.2d at 722.
19388 U.S. 395, 87 S. Ct. 1801, 18 L. Ed. 2d 1270 (1967). PrimaPaintis a lynchpin in arbitration law. All attorneys dealing with arbitration should read and understand
PrimaPaint.PrimaPaintprevents parties from avoiding arbitration by invoking fraud
or other tort claims. Absent PrimaPaint,arbitration is essentially worthless, as a trial
on the validity of the contract would regularly occur prior to arbitration, and very few
litigants would fight for the right to have a second proceeding.
40
Prima Paint,388 U.S. at 403-04.
"' Shearson Lehman Bros., Inc. v. Crisp, 646 So. 2d 613, 616 (Ala. 1994).
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E. Agreement to Arbitrate Disputes
Arising out of Statutes
Under the FAA, broad agreements to arbitrate may encompass disputes
arising from statutory schemes. For example, the FAA has been held to
apply to statutory age discrimination claims in Gilmerv. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp.42 Although section one of the FAA provides that the Act
does not apply to a contract of employment of any class of workers
engaged in foreign or interstate commerce, the Supreme Court held that
this was not applicable to an arbitration clause in a securities application.43
"Having made a bargain to arbitrate," the petitioner was held to it unless
he showed proof that "Congress itselfhas evinced an intention to preclude
a waiver of judicial remedies for the statutory rights at issue. '" The
Court held that claims under the Age Discrimination Employment Act
(ADEA) were subject to resolution by actions of the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission aside from judicial resolution, and therefore,
found that Congress did not intend to make the resolution of ADEA
claims solely an issue forjudicial review. 4' The petitioner failed to prove
that the ADEA specifically precluded arbitration of ADEA claims, and
therefore, the decision that the petitioner's claim was subject to arbitration
was affirmed.
The Fifth Circuit followed Gilmer in Miller v. PublicStorageManagement, Inc., holding that the FAA encompassed a statutory disability
claim. 46 The appellant, a former employee, signed and initialed each page
of an arbitration agreement presented by the appellee employer, which
required any dispute arising over employment termination to be resolved
by binding arbitration.47 When the appellant was later terminated after
not returning to work following a medical leave, she filed an action
500 U.S. 20, 26-27, 111 S. Ct. 1647, 1652, 114 L. Ed. 2d 26 (1991).
4' Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 25 n.2.
42

44d. at 26.
41Id. at 27-29; see 29 U.S.C. § 621 (2001) (Congressional Statement of Findings
and Purpose).
46 121 F.3d 215 (5th Cir. 1997).
41Miller, 121 F.3d at 216-17.
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against appellee under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) 48 and
Texas law.49 The trial court dismissed the appellant's claims and compelled arbitration pursuant to the agreement signed by appellant." The
appellant challenged that ruling and the court affirmed. The court
dismissed the appellant's claims that she was not subject to the FAA, 5'
and held that the exclusions therein applied only to employees particularly
engaged in interstate commerce. 2 The court found that the ADA advocated the use of alternative dispute resolution and held that the FAA
preempted any conflicting state anti-arbitration law. Thus, the agreement
signed by appellant was enforceable under the FAA.53

F. Contractual Language Needed
to Invoke Arbitration
There has been much discussion about how statutes and cases give
effect to arbitration clauses in contracts. But what must be contained in
such a clause to invoke arbitration? The language must propose to finally
end a dispute. For example, in PaineWebberInc. v. Chase Manhattan
PrivateBank, the following language was held insufficient to bind the
parties to arbitration, even in light of strong federal policy favoring
arbitration: "to the appropriate arbitrator or court in the United States."54
The court explained its reasoning:
Importantly, the Referral Agreement does not state that any dispute shall be
submitted "either" to arbitration or the courts, as PaineWebber insists.
Rather, it states that disputes between PaineWebber and Chase-Switzerland
shall be submitted "to the appropriate arbitrator or court in the United
States." How then, we ask rhetorically, can this provision be deemed a bind4' Id.
at 217;

see 42

U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (1990); see TEX.LAB. CODE ANN. §§
451.001-.003 (Vernon 1996).
49
TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. § § 451.001-.003 (Vernon 1996); Miller, 121 F.3d at 217.
0
' Miller, 121 F.3d at 217.
519 U.S.C. §§ 1-14 (1947).
S2Miller, 121 F.3d at 218.
53Id.

- 260 F.3d 453, 462-63 (5th Cir. 2001).
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ing agreement to arbitrate any and all disputes (which precludes by its very
terms any court resolution) when it identifies "court" and "arbitration" as

equals in that very provision? Significantly, there is no mention of a specific
geographic location for arbitration, no selection of an arbitral forum such
as the NYSE or the NASD, and no language requiring arbitration. The
dispute resolution clause in the Referral Agreement, then, simply leaves too
many critical elements unaddressed to support PaineWebber's contention
that the Referral Agreement, standing alone, amounts to a binding arbitration
agreement between the parties."

G. Procedural Fairness Is Not Required for
Enforceable Arbitration Clauses
Arbitration clauses do not have to be fair,5 6 but extreme deviations
from customary language or procedure may allow a reluctant litigator to
challenge the clause. For example, in the "Steak House Cases," the Sixth
and Seventh Circuits held arbitration agreements to be illusory and
unenforceable when one side was able to alter the rules of arbitration with
unfettered discretion. 7 Because one-sided or overreaching provisions
may be stricken by a court, they invite litigation.

H. Duty to Arbitrate Compared
With Jurisdiction
Whether the parties have a duty to arbitrate is an issue for the court.
For example, in American Fuel Corp. v. Utah Energy Dev. Co., the
respondent individual was co-founder of respondent energy company."
The petitioner fuel corporation hired respondent individual as a consultant

55
PaineWebber,260
56

F.3d at 462-63.
See Montez v. Prudential Sec., Inc., 260 F.3d 980 (8th Cir. 2001) (finding the
fact that an arbitrator had done significant business with former employer's law firm
and attorney was insufficient to prove evident impartiality). As noted below, this allows
a party to a contract to insist on a one-sided clause.
Penn v. Ryan's Family Steak Houses, 269 F.3d 753, 759 (7th Cir. 2001); Floss
v. Ryan's Family Steak Houses, 211 F.3d 306, 315-16(6th Cir. 2000), cert.denied, 531
U.S. 1072 (2001).
5s 122 F.3d 130, 132 (2d Cir. 1997).
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for its corporation. 9 The respondent individual was terminated for alleged

solicitation of projects for his own company, and the respondents filed
suit alleging breach of the agreement ° The district court found that the
employment agreement bound the respondent individual "to arbitrate his
claims because all the claims were 'related' to that agreement" and that
such agreement compelled the same from respondent company because
it was the alter ego of respondent individual.6 ' The respondent energy
company appealed the alter ego status. 62 The Second Circuit reversed and

vacated the stay on the litigation with respect to respondent energy
company's claims, finding that its claims of breach involved petitioner
fuel corporation's agreement with them and that the petitioner failed to
show that the lawsuit constituted the kind of fraudulent or wrongful
conduct that called for piercing the corporate veil. 63 The court concluded
64
that the respondent energy company was not bound to arbitrate.
The duty to arbitrate, discussed above, is a distinct concept from jurisdiction. A jurisdictional inquiry, however, overlaps with the duty to
arbitrate an issue. The issue ofwhether a party has a duty to arbitrate and
whether the arbitrator has jurisdiction to decide the issue sometimes
appears to be the same inquiry with a different label.65

L Consent
Despite its central role in the arbitration framework, few cases or
commentators have analyzed the nature and scope of arbitration consent.
Even sophisticated commercial agreements to arbitrate may be devoid
59

Am. Fuel Corp., 122 F.3d at 132.

6 Id.
61 Id.
62 Id.
63 Id.

64Id. at 134.

For example, what would a court do ifan arbitrator was, according to the arbitration clause, "without jurisdiction" to issue a legally erroneous award? Would a court
consider a challenge to an award under such a clause a jurisdictional issue that was a
matter for the court to decide, or a review on the merits that was unreviewable? No court
65

has decided.
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ofknowing consent due to the unfamiliarity of the parties' attorneys with
the realities and consequences ofarbitration. This unfamiliarity translates
into a client without cogent legal advice to knowingly consent to arbitra-

tion in lieu of traditional litigation.
Consent can create a super tribunal of sorts.66 For example, the United
States Supreme Court has held that, if contracting parties consent to
include claims for punitive damages "within the issues to be arbitrated,
the FAA ensures that their agreement will be enforced according to its
terms even if a rule of state law would otherwise exclude such claims
from arbitration." 67 Thus, in a real sense, an arbitrator can award greater
remedies than a court.
The practical significance lies in the fact that courts often override consensual provisions in the name ofpublic policy. Non-competition clauses,
excessive liquidated damage provisions, and disclaimers of express
warranties are all routinely struck down by courts even if theywere voluntarily entered into. Ifthe parties ask an arbitrator to construe the contract,
however, and the parties can agree to relief beyond the relief available
from a court, the arbitrator may well enforce the contract language.
Although this may seem far-fetched, it has already occurred.
Recently, for example, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit refused to consider overturning an award that provided
for relief that arguably violated antitrust laws. In Baxter International,
Inc. v. Abbott Labs, the Seventh Circuit refused to examine an arbitration
award that arguably created an arrangement that violates an antitrust
award.68 Judge Ripple, dissenting from a decision to deny a petition for
re-hearing en banc,wrote that Baxter's submission that the opinion holds
that the "[a]rbitrators have the unreviewable authority to decide for themselves whether they are commanding the parties to violate the law" has
"strength." Further, "the role of the courts to interpret and uphold the law
should not be dismissed casually., 69 Thus, the Seventh Circuit held that

' See Jeffrey J. Mayer & Theodore W. Seitz, Recognizing and UnderstandingConsent Issues in Arbitration, 79 MICH. B.J. 504, 505 (2000).
67
Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 514 U.S. 52, 52, 115 S. Ct. 1212,
1214, 131 L. Ed. 2d 76 (1995).
68 315 F.3d 829, 832 (7th Cir.), reh 'g en banc denied, 325 F.3d 954, cert. denied,
540 U.S. 963 (2003).
69 Baxter Int'l,, 325 F.3d at 955 (Ripple, J., dissenting).
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an arbitrator has the power to issue an award beyond the capabilities of
a federal court.70

III. Choices in Drafting Arbitration Clauses:
Advocacy at the Negotiation Stage
A. Arbitration Clauses Can and
Should Be Shaped to the Particular Dispute
Arbitration law thus provides parties tremendous flexibility in designing dispute resolution procedure. At the same time, if the parties fail to
provide the arbitrator or arbitrators sufficient guidance, arbitration law
and related procedures could produce a long, expensive procedure, along
with a result that is unacceptable and perhaps unlawful. The authors
therefore urge attorneys to avoid viewing the decision to submit a dispute
to arbitration as a choice between full-blown litigation and a general
arbitration clause. The FAA permits the parties to design their own
procedure. Different types of contract relationships may suggest different
types of dispute resolution strategies.
For example, where no jury is possible, where an injunction or other
equitable remedy is the likely goal, or where there is a need for extensive
discovery, litigation may be a better approach than arbitration. In other
situations, arbitration is rarely appropriate. That is, it would be foolhardy
in many cases to submit trademark validity to an arbitrator. The value
of a mark and the extensive body of case law guiding courts in resolution
of trademark disputes suggest that a court is a better option. Given the
available trademark case law, losing the right to appeal by directing the
trademark dispute to arbitration is a significant procedural sacrifice. In
other situations, such as a technical contract dispute, the authors strongly
urge consideration of a carefully drafted arbitration clause. In such a case,
factual analysis, rather than the legal doctrine, will control. An arbitrator
knowledgeable in the technical area at issue will be a better and more
efficient decision-maker than a court or a jury. Furthermore, as such a

70

id.
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technical case would turn on factual issues that are unlikely to be addressed by the appellate court, the loss of appellate review is less important.
The authors do not wish to be dogmatic on these points. It is certainly
fair to say that reasonable attorneys may disagree on desirability of
arbitration in different circumstances. It is important, however, to have
some philosophy for drafting arbitration clauses. In many cases, little or
no thought is given to drafting. As one California court complained, "we
spend too much time trying to make sense out of arbitration agreements
precisely because litigants spend too little time drafting them. Increasingly, we have been presented with incoherent hybrids and bizarre
mutations of supposed agreements forjudicial or contractual arbitration.
Oftentimes the 'remedy' is worse than the disease."7

B. Economy Versus Fairness
Consider two of the most commonly perceived concerns arising from
the distinctions between litigation and arbitration: absence of discovery
and the quality of the decision-maker. Each of these concerns may be
addressed easily.
Parties are free to provide for discovery in arbitration. Under the FAA,
this tribunal has plenary power over discovery, including the right to order
pre-hearing discovery even without specific provision for discovery.72
Furthermore, parties may provide for the professional qualifications of
the arbitrator, or for more than one person to serve as arbitrators in the
dispute. In a real estate construction dispute, for example, the parties may
require that the arbitrator be a licensed architect, builder, real estate
attorney, or some combination of the above.
The parties may control the manner and presentation of evidence
through contract. In construction disputes, an arbitration clause may provide that the parties and the tribunal may rely upon site visits and available technical information such as plans and drawings. Indeed, the
authors note that even a brief inquiry reveals over twenty-five issues that
could be considered for each proposed arbitration clause.
71Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Nationwide Ins. Co., 69 Call. App. 4th 709, 716, 82
Cal. Rptr. 2d 16, 19 (Ct. App. 1999).
72 See Stanton v. Paine Webber Jackson & Curtis, Inc., 685 F. Supp. 1241, 1242-43
(S.D. Fla. 1988).
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DraftingIssue Checklist
* Should the parties agree to allow or, by contrast, eliminate discovery?
" Should the parties limit the time from filing of the demand until the
hearing in order to obtain an expedited hearing?
" What rules of confidentiality should apply?
" Should written submissions be permitted? Written submissions are
often very expensive.
* Should the parties relax the rules of evidence for the arbitration?
* Should the parties use one arbitrator or three or even more?
" Should there be a written decision and, if so, should there be findings
of fact and conclusions of law and/or reasoning for the award? (Some
foreign courts will not enforce an award without reasoning.)
* Should the parties select the venue for the arbitration, defer to the
arbitration panel, or use a variation, such as one that requires the party
73
commencing the arbitration to proceed in the opponent's venue?
" Whether the parties should select an arbitrator in advance and identify
that individual in the agreement?
" Should the parties require the arbitrators to have specific technical
expertise?
* Should the parties adopt the rules of an arbitral institution, such as the
American Arbitration Association (AAA), the National Arbitration
Forum, International Chamber of Commerce, or Judicial Arbitration
and Mediation Services (JAMS)? If so, should any of those rules be
modified?
* What substantive and procedural rules should apply to experts? Ifthe
arbitrator is an expert, should the parties be allowed to present experts
at all?
* Should the arbitrator be required to make an on-site visit to evaluate
the property or material at issue?
* Should the parties include a provision permitting the arbitrator to enter
a default? Under the AAA rules, for example, default is sometimes
difficult to obtain.
7' For example, if one party was in Los Angeles and the other in Alberta, the arbitration would proceed in Los Angeles if the Canadian party presented the arbitration
petition.
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* Should the arbitration clause be self-executing, or do the parties have
to seek court intervention to enforce its provisions?
* Should a company use different procedures for different claims?
* Do you want transcripts?
* Should the parties instruct the arbitrator as to who has the burden of
proof?
* Do the parties want the arbitrator to be a former judge and invoke the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, simulating federal court procedures?
* Do the parties want to define a standard of review? Is such a clause
permissible in your district?
" Do you want to expressly limit the jurisdiction, carving out small
claims cases, runaway awards, or injunctive relief?
" Do you want to empower the arbitration to limit cumulative or
duplicate evidence?74
* Should there be a time limit in which the arbitrator is expected to make
rulings and render awards?
* Should the parties end the case with closing arguments, closing briefs,
or both?
" Do you wish to provide for mandatory settlement discussions? If so,
do you wish to do so before the proceeding begins, after the evidence
is presented, or at some other time? If settlement meetings are mandatory, should the clause require the attendance of specific party
representatives?
* For employment disputes, did you meet requisite due process standards?

74
Arbitrators often err on the side of admissibility when making evidentiary decisions, which in turn, increases the length of the hearing. The FAA and the rules governing arbitrations encourage the admission ofevidence, even if irrelevant. The FAA provides that awards may be set aside for failure to consider evidence. 9 U.S.C. § 10
(2000). For example, section 31 of the AAA Commercial Arbitration Rules states, "The
parties may offer such evidence as is relevant and material to the dispute and shall
produce such evidence as the arbitrator may deem necessary to an understanding and
determination of the dispute.... Conformity to legal rules of evidence shall not be
necessary." M. RB. ASS'N AAA COMMERCIAL DISPUTE RESOLUTION PROCEDURES RULE

3931 (1996). But this rule can be circumscribed and the hearings expedited through
drafting or stipulation of the parties. Such is a suggested course of action should the
parties desire a quicker, more streamlined arbitration proceeding.
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C. Sample Arbitration Clauses
Consideration of these multiple factors in different situations leads to
radically different clauses. A starting point for any serious drafting of
clauses often requires express adoption of the FAA. Once the parties
determine that they wish to proceed to binding arbitration for the
resolution of disputes, either exclusively or within certain guidelines, they
should adopt the FAA as the choice of law. This results in a clearer
outcome, because there has been more attention by the courts to this
regime. To explicitly adopt the FAA, the phrase to use is as follows:
"that notwithstanding anything to the contrary in the agreement,
enforcement of this arbitrationclause, mattersof arbitrationprocedure, and enforcement of any resulting awardshall be governed by
the FederalArbitration Act, applicable internationaltreaties, and
implementing nationalor domestic law. "

The parties often consider selecting an arbitration provider and
providing for the use of it and its roles in their arbitration clause. An
arbitration provider is often a private company, despite such official
sounding names as the American Arbitration Association (AAA). There
are potential advantages to using such a clause: the clauses are brief, they
have been construed by both arbitrators and courts, and such clauses
incorporate all the institutional rules of the provider, making express
drafting of provisions for discovery and the like unnecessary. These
clauses, however, are merely a starting point; if used carelessly, they may
have unpleasant surprises. The National Arbitration Forum recommends
the following broad-standard arbitration clause for business disputes:
The Partiesagree that any claim or dispute between them or againstany
agent, employee, successor,or assign of the other, whether relatedto this
agreementor otherwise,and any claim or dispute related to this agreement
or the relationshipor duties contemplatedunder this contract,includingthe
validity of this arbitrationclause, shall be resolved by binding arbitration
by the NationalArbitrationForum, under the Code of Procedurethen in
effect. Any award ofthe arbitrator(s)may be entered as ajudgment in any
court havingjurisdiction.In the event a court havingjurisdictionfinds any
portion ofthis agreementunenforceable,thatportionshall not be effective
andthe remainderofthe agreementshallremaineffective. Informationmay
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be obtainedandclaims may befiled at any office ofthe NationalArbitration
Forum, www.arbitration-forum.com, or at P.O. Box 50191, Minneapolis,
MN 55405. This agreementshall be governed by andinterpretedunder the
FederalArbitrationAct, 9 US.C. Sections 1-16.'s

This broad clause does not, however, reveal a significant component
ofthe Forum's procedure. Under the Forum rules, "legal decisions should
be decided according to established legal principles."76 According to the
Forum's website, "Forum's arbitrators take an oath promising to render
legal decisions according to the law, rather than undefined 'fairness. "'77
Other organizations encourage their arbitrators to act as a court of equity.
As such, if business people are looking for an equitable "merchants
court," the National Arbitration Forum is not the right forum, and the
casual use of such a clause will not serve the parties well. Furthermore,
on the drafting issues identified above, the rules of institutional providers
are often of no help. For example, the AAA does not set time limits or
areas of required expertise for a dispute, and thus the use of a general
clause does not change the need to look closely at specific needs. Using
these principles, the authors present four sample clauses. For each of the
sample clauses below, we have identified the key concepts driving the
outcome.78

Sample Clause I
Distributionof Funds in Escrow Account:
AddressingRate Business Issues through Arbitration

Any dispute that may arise relating to the distribution of funds in the
escrow account, including payment from that account as described above,
shall be submitted to binding arbitration before the American Arbitration
7

1 NAT'L ARBITRATION FORUM, DRAFTING MEDIATION AND ARBITRATION CLAUSES:
A PRACTICAL GUIDE WITH SAMPLE PROVISIONS 7 (2003), availableat http://www.arb-

forum.com/articles/whitepapers/clz903.pdf.
76

NAT'LARBrrRATIONFORUM, DRAFTING ARBrrRATION CLAUSES 2 (2003), available

at http://www.arb-forumcom/articles/docs/sc0503.doc.
77 Id.
78

The authors intend to discuss these clauses in greater detail during the upcoming
conference.
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Association before a single arbitrator. The arbitration is to be conducted
in [location] in accordance with the expedited commercial arbitration
rules, as existing as of the time the arbitration is commenced, of the
American Arbitration Association. Judgment upon the arbitration award
maybe entered by any court of competent jurisdiction. The arbitrator will
be entitled to apportion the costs of the arbitration proceedings and to
award any party its attorney fees on such grounds as he or she deems just.
The arbitratorwill not have authority to awardpunitive or exemplary
damages, but shallhave the authoritytoprovideforinjunctive reliefand
to direct thepayment offunds held in escrow. The partiesdo not desire
a written opinion. Notwithstanding anything to the contrary in this
Agreement, enforcement of this dispute resolution clause, matters of
arbitration procedure, and enforcement of arbitration awards shall be
governed by the Federal Arbitration Act.
-KEY POINTS:
I. Language directs and limits the arbitrator to the simple matter before
her; the language thus controls costs.
2. The parties have no reason to pay an arbitrator for a written opinion
or the other trappings of litigation.
3. The clause limits the arbitrator's jurisdiction, thereby ensuring court
review is available if the arbitrator disobeys instructions." By
contrast, if the limitations were contractual between the parties, the
arbitrator would be effectively free to disobey those instructions.

Sample Clause II
ProfessionalEngagement
Professional Firm and Client agree that all disputes arising out of or
relating to this Agreement will be resolved by three arbitrators of the
[ARBITRAL INSTITUTION such as AAA or JAMS] at a location
convenient to the parties, the fmal decision on location to be decided by
the [ARBITRAL INSTITUTION] following consultation with the parties.
The parties agree to permit three depositions per side and such additional

" See Longo, supra note 7 and accompanying text.
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discovery as the arbitrator shall determine. However, absent exceptional
good cause, the arbitrators will not permit third party discovery depositions or interrogatories. All three arbitrators shall have substantial
experience in [PROFESSIONAL FIELD SUCH AS ARCHITECTURE].
The parties desire a written opinion. Notwithstanding anything to the
contrary in this Agreement, enforcement of this dispute resolution clause,
matters of arbitration procedure, and enforcement of arbitration awards
shall be governed by the Federal Arbitration Act. [The professional
should consider ifthere are any ethical limitations on the right to establish
an arbitration procedure.]
-KEY POINT:

With a complex dispute being a real possibility, the parties are ensuring appropriate expertise and requiring the arbitrator to provide reasoning
supporting what may be a complex decision.

Sample Clause III
Settlement Agreement with a "Short Fuse " Arbitration Provision
By way of introduction, this clause was successfully used to resolve
a significant development dispute in the Southwest. A developer had sold
land and made a commitment to Mr. Mayer's client to meet a development timetable regarding the construction of infrastructure, such as the
pipes for water and cables for electricity. Absent water, the purchaser
(a developer-builder) could not obtain a building permit, much less begin
construction. The seller thereafter breached its obligation to provide water
and electricity. At the same time, the landowner continued to develop
infrastructure on nearby land that it owned. The seller refused to compensate Mr. Mayer's client for these delays, raising various, weak defenses.
Shortly after Mr. Mayer's client filed a complaint regarding the breach
ofthe development schedule, the parties reached a settlement in principle
involving a cash payment compensating his client for the delay and setting
a revised schedule for providing water and electricity. The open drafting
question for the settlement document was: what happened if the seller
failed to adhere to the new schedule? Mr. Mayer's client was not excited
about a new complaint if and when the development schedule was
breached again or, even worse, a series of lawsuits over the next several
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years. The answer was this "short fuse" clause and a per-day liquidated
damages provision. The seller proceeded to breach the new schedule.
Given the clause, terms, and timetable in the arbitration clause, the seller
simply wrote millions of dollars in checks to Mr. Mayer's client, because
the clause prevented the seller from stopping an examination of its
failures.
Settlement Agreement with a "Short Fuse " Arbitration Provision
The parties agree that all disputes arising out of or relating to this
Settlement Agreement shall be resolved in binding arbitration before the
American Arbitration Association (AAA) by a single arbitrator under the
expedited procedures of the AAA Commercial Arbitration Rules. The
locale for the arbitration shall be [LOCATION]. The arbitrator may award
costs and attorneys fees to the prevailing party in any arbitration and shall
seek to implement the parties' intent expressed in the settlement agreement to bind [PARTY] to the revised development schedule. The
arbitratorwill accordingly hold an informalpre-hearingwithin thirty
(30) days of the due date of the answer to the arbitrationdemand with
the final hearing being held within sixty (60) days following the prehearing. The parties desire a written opinion within thirty (30) days
following the hearing. The partiesagree that no discovery depositions
will be taken of the parties, but the parties will exchange documents,
pursuantto reasonablewritten requests. The arbitrator shall visit the site.
The arbitrator's failure to adhere to the time limits in this clause will not
divest him or her of jurisdiction. Notwithstanding anything to the
contrary in this Agreement, enforcement of this dispute resolution clause,
matters of arbitration procedure, and enforcement of arbitration awards
shall be governed by the Federal Arbitration Act. The provisions of this
Section are intended to benefit and bind certain third party non-signatories
and will continue in full force and effect subsequent to and notwithstanding the expiration or termination of this Agreement.

Sample Clause IV
ConstructionDisputes
This sample clause is used in construction contracts by a builder
concentrating on building extreme luxury homes woi'th three million
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dollars or more. In order to ensure that the customer is not discouraged
by the complexity ofthe clause, the "Terms and Conditions" are included
in a separate "Appendix A."
ConstructionDisputes
Arbitration
A. The parties agree that any and all disputes, claims or controversies
arising out of or relating to this Agreement shall be submitted to
"JAMS," (a national organization employing retired judges and
others), or its successor for final and binding arbitration.
B. Either party may initiate arbitration at any time by filing a written
demand for arbitration with JAMS, with a copy to the other party.
C. A party withholding performance at the time of commencement of
arbitration must provide a specific itemized statement of those reasons
for withholding performance within ten days of the selection of the
arbitrator. Any matter not listed as a reason for non-performance that
was known or should have been known at the time of selection of the
arbitrator is waived if not contained in the itemized statement. The
arbitrator will not have the authority to extend the ten-day deadline
for submission of the itemized statement absent extraordinary good
cause, such as illness or other pressing personal matter. The arbitration will be conducted under the then current JAMS Comprehensive
Arbitration Rules and the Arbitration Terms and Conditions attached
as "Appendix A."
Appendix A
Arbitration Terms and Conditions
(1) Any arbitration arising out of or relating to this Agreement will be
conducted in accordance with the provisions of JAMS' Comprehensive Arbitration Rules and Procedures in effect at the time of filing
of the demand for arbitration. The parties agree that Contractor's
directors, officers, employees, shareholders, owners, members,
advisors, and sister, parent, and subsidiary entities (the "Related
Parties") are third party beneficiaries of the arbitration provisions of
this Agreement and will be entitled to invoke this arbitration clause
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in any dispute arising out of or relating to this Agreement. All
or this "Appendix A" shall also
references to parties in Article
be considered a reference to the Related Parties. The parties will
cooperate with JAMS and with one another in selecting an arbitrator
from JAMS' panel of neutrals, and in scheduling the arbitration
proceedings. The parties covenant that they will participate in the
arbitration in good faith and subject to express fee-shifting provisions
in this Agreement, including provisions in "Appendix A," and that
they will share equally in JAMS' costs.
(2) The parties have a strong interest in the efficient and economical
resolution of any dispute arising out of or relating to this Agreement.
Accordingly, notwithstanding any provision to the contrary in this
Agreement or in applicable JAMS' rules, the parties provide for the
following procedures in connection with disputes submitted to
arbitration:
" First, the arbitrator has the express authority to exclude cumulative
or duplicative evidence.
" Second, the parties do not require a transcript but do request a
written decision setting forth the reasons for the arbitrator's
decision.
* Third, in the event that the dispute concerns matters that collectively will result in an award of $50,000.00 or less (an "Expedited
Matter") the parties agree to certain abbreviated procedures. In an
Expedited Matter, the arbitrator will not permit any discovery and,
further, will have the option of deciding the matter following a
hearing or instead solely upon written submissions, argument of
counsel, and a visit to the site as the arbitrator decides in his or her
discretion. In order to conserve expenses, the arbitrator is authorized to conduct hearings in Expedited Matters by telephone. For
any such Expedited Matter, the arbitrator will hold a hearing, if he
or she concludes one is appropriate, within thirty days following
his or her selection and issue a ruling within ninety days following
his or her selection.
" Finally, for all disputes in which in excess of $50,000 is at issue
(a "Substantial Dispute"), the arbitrator will accept such live
relevant testimony as proffered by the parties but, absent extraordinary good cause, will not hold a hearing of more than four days.
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In Substantial Disputes, the arbitrator will permit reasonable party
and third party discovery, including depositions, and, among other
matters, inquiry into any itemized statement of reasons supporting
a withholding of performance. In Substantial Disputes, the
arbitrator will hold a hearing within ninety days of his or her
selection and issue a ruling within 150 days of his or her selection.
e In the event that the parties are in dispute over whether a matter is
properly considered an Expedited Matter or Substantial Matter, the
arbitrator shall decide. The arbitrator will not losejurisdiction over
the matters submitted to arbitration if he or she fails to meet the
deadlines specified in these Arbitration Terms and Conditions.
(3) The exclusive venue for all arbitration proceedings shall be in
[APPLICABLE FORUM] with the site of the arbitration chosen by
the arbitrator in his or her discretion. The exclusive venue for all
judicial proceedings relating to this Agreement shall be the state and
federal courts serving [FORUM]. However, the arbitration provisions
of this Agreement including this "Appendix A," the enforcement of
any third party subpoena issued by an arbitrator, or the confirmation,
enforcement, or collection of an arbitration award may proceed
outside of the state and federal courts serving
County if the
person or property at issue is outside the jurisdiction of such county.
(4) Time periods relevant to an arbitration proceeding shall be calculated
as provided in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
_

-KEY POINTS:
Under this clause, the complaining party must "put up or shut up" by
identifying defects or other breaches at the time they are refusing to
perform. The clause differentiates between different size disputes so that
minor disputes can be addressed in small claims court while major, multimillion dollar disputes have the benefit of discovery and other legal
procedures appropriate for a significant dispute.

IV. Advocacy at an Arbitration Hearing
Much of the negative lore regarding arbitration arises from disagreeable and, even disastrous, arbitration hearings. Certainly, a portion of the
grumbling is due to the fact that a case loser rarely praises the decision-
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maker, and virtually every case that proceeds through hearing to decision
has a perceived winner and loser. An additional cause of the dissatisfaction is parties' failure, as noted above, to understand and prepare for the
dispute by anticipating likely disputes and drafting an appropriate clause.
However, in significant part, dissatisfaction arises from failure to fully
and properly advocate your position at the hearing. Unless constrained
by specific limits in a clause, arbitration effectively has no rules, given
that the standard rules provide discretion to the arbitrator and little
guidance to the parties. As such standard, advocacy techniques are often
ineffective.
The apparent lawlessness of arbitration is exacerbated, according to
many attorneys of which the percentage is unclear, because their colleagues act less than ethically during arbitration. It is difficult to test this
proposition empirically, but for both theoretical and practical reasons,
attorneys do at least sometimes play fast and loose in arbitration.
Theoretically, it is unclear what rules govern, and ethical rules are perhaps
pre-empted by the FAA pursuant to Doctors Assocs. v. Casarotto.°
Practically, an arbitrator has limited ability to punish recalcitrant parties.
An arbitrator does not have contempt power and is likely unwilling to
enter a default based upon individual incidents. An arbitrator, unlike a
judge, may also be unwilling to issue a harsh denunciation of unethical
behavior.
Given this environment, a successful advocate must (1) control the
rules and (2) use effective forensic techniques appropriate to the forum.

A. Controlling the Rules
Given that the arbitrator works at the direction of the parties, the
parties can alter or refine the rules during the course of the arbitration.
Ideally, the control of the arbitration is partially codified in the arbitration
clause. Certainly, part of the control process is an openness, a real
willingness, to negotiate procedure with your adversary during the
dispute. However, techniques exist to drive certainty even without your
opponents' consent. For example, Mr. Mayer typically files and serves
so 517 U.S. 681, 116 S. Ct. 1652, 134 L. Ed. 2d 902 (1996).
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a pre-conference memorandum on the very first day the arbitrator contacts
the parties (and well before the first formal meeting). This memorandum
should not be argumentative and should contain, among other matters,
the following:
* A straightforward factual presentation that, while designed to present
your client's case in a favorable light, is not argumentative or lengthy
and, as such, is useful to inform the arbitrator of the central issues in
the case;
" A proposed paper discovery schedule;
* Proposed stipulations, such as the right to exclude cumulative evidence
or present summary material;
* An identification of likely issues;
* A desired timing for an award; and
* A proposed statement of agreed and disputed facts.
Although this type ofmemorandum is not required by arbitration rules,
it is not prohibited. As long as it is not argumentative, it is virtually
always used by the arbitrator as a checklist and guide for procedural
decision-making. Most importantly, it forces the other side to wrestle
with these issues before the arbitration becomes so heated that agreement
is difficult, if not impossible. The pre-conference memorandum is
particularly effective as the adversary almost never files one, believing
that the first telephone conference will be an informal chat. 8 Using such
an approach, open areas of the arbitration may be resolved early and
efficiently.

B. Forensic Techniques
Additionally, advocates in arbitration should adjust their techniques
for questioning witnesses and presenting evidence. While a full discussion of arbitration hearing techniques are beyond the scope of this article,
we would like to provide a sampling of the challenges and potential
responses. Even attorneys who will never go near a hearing room must
"IMr. Mayer usually forces the other side to say, "I didn't know I had to file one."
At that point, his case having been presented, he simply notes that the other side is free
to file their own memorandum.
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understand these hearing issues, because it will inform and improve their
drafting efforts.
For example, in full-blown civil litigation the trial usually reflects a
distillation of existing information. Trial lawyers usually do not ask
questions if they do not know the answer. Lawyers who do not know the
answers to questions in a federal court trial may not have taken full
advantage of the discovery process. In arbitration, however, you may
have to ask questions that are dangerous, because the questioner may not
know the answers to the questions. Such blind cross-examination,
however, is often a necessary part of arbitration.
To begin with, if you do not ask an obvious question, an active
decision-maker will ask and develop such dangerous testimony without
your participation. By contrast, ajudge orjury is unlikely to step in and
fill in the gaps in your questioning. Further, if you do not ask an obvious
question, you highlight the dangerous testimony; the arbitrator flatters
himself or herself at developing the apparent smoking gun. Moreover,
you may fail to meet your burden of proof if you are questioning a witness
necessary to prove your case. What should you do?

C. Definition Questions
The authors believe "definition" questions are helpful. By asking the
witness to define various terms, the questioner can box in the witness
without risking the disclosure ofnegative information. When the critical
questions are asked, the questioner can impeach a damaging answer by
using the definitions against the witness.
Example: Automotive Die Case. The defendant claimed payment was
not due to a plaintiff die manufacturer because the automotive dies
were defective. The plaintiff claimed that the dies met industry
standards. During discovery, despite repeated motions and interrogatories, the defendant was unable to obtain specifics of the plaintiffs
position on the so-called industry standards that applied to the dies.
At the hearing, the examination of the key witness began by seeking
the witness's definitions of all possible terms related to industry
standards. As the answers came in, the questioner could compare the
answers to the defects in the dies to the defined industry standards.
Knowing that once he asked about the defects, he could impeach the
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witness against the standards already established. The questioner only
asked about those defects that contradicted the testimony provided by
the witness. At the same time, the definition questions did not risk
the disclosure of negative information, as the definition of a standard
is not inherently damaging.

D. Branching Questions
Similarly, in blind cross-examination, what we call "branching"
questions is also useful. Branching questions force a witness to take one
of two or three positions, any one of which may be useful to the questioner. The examiner must be persistent and not allow the witness to
refuse to take a position.

E. Boring Questions
During arbitration, do not rule out deliberately "boring" questions that
may allow the probing of dangerous areas while nobody may be paying
attention, as in late in the day. If the boring questions reveal damaging
information, even ifpeople are listening, the emotional impact is lessened,
because the information is not extracted as part of what the examiner,
herself, has set up as a critical confrontation. Ifthe boring questions elicit
helpful testimony, it can always be packaged later as part of closing
arguments and briefs.

F. Withholding Information
Arbitration also may involve "withholding" information from your
adversary. Without interrogatories or a disclosure obligation, do you have
any obligation to fully explain your theories to your adversary? It
depends. Sandbagging is a part of every arbitration Mr. Mayer has been
involved in. As a result, Mr. Mayer also holds back information unless
required by agreement or the rules. Such withholding is, in Mr. Mayer's
view, a legitimate strategic tactic absent an order or dishonesty, such as
denying that you have such information.
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Conclusion
It is critical to master the interplay between an arbitration clause and
the hearing, itself. Litigation counsel should participate in and understand
the drafting process, while transaction counsel should understand advocacy challenges at a hearing.
Most disputes settle. As such, the allocation of risk drives settlement
decisions. Thus, the outcome of the dispute subject to the arbitration
clause turns on the risk and cost created by the applicable arbitration
procedure. Making the arbitration rules and understanding arbitration
law allows counsel to place increased risk on the other party, which will
help in determining a favorable settlement. Further, in the event that the
case does proceed to hearing, counsel's client will be positioned to
aggressively present their case.
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